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231 
On Commitments 
Jennifer W. Reynolds  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal negotiators are in the business of making commitments. 
Orchestrating charged discussions, coming up with creative ways to 
satisfy interests, sifting through relationships and responsibilities, 
drafting contracts and other complex agreements, dealing with the 
aftermath of broken promises—in all cases, establishing and re-
establishing what and how the parties commit to one another—are 
central to the negotiating enterprise. In standard interest-based 
negotiations or mediations, commitments are the final stage of a 
process in which negotiators manage both substantive issues and 
relational concerns while intentionally dismantling unproductive 
positions so that the parties may explore the integrative potential of 
identifying underlying interests, and then generating value-creating 
options to satisfy those interests.
1
 Put another way, interest-based 
processes transform some number of party interests into action items, 
deliverables, contract provisions, memorandums of understanding, 
preambles, press releases, promises, declarations of intention; that is, 
interests become commitments. 
And often the opposite is true: commitments can become interests, 
insofar as they are constitutive elements (explicit or not) in future 
negotiations and decisions. This transformation is less apparent and 
often invisible. That a decision made today might shape or foreclose 
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M.A., University of Texas at Austin; A.B., University of Chicago. Many thanks to the 
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 1. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).  
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the choices of tomorrow may seem intuitive, but often does not occur 
to the parties negotiating in the present moment.
2
 The binding nature 
of commitments can clarify present priorities and facilitate joint 
efforts, but can also hinder quick responses to future opportunities or 
threats. As such, a tension exists between the need to make 
commitments and the (often unexpected and intractable) difficulties 
that arise from having made them.
3
 Legal negotiators, as commitment 
makers and re-makers, regularly work within this tension without 
necessarily being aware of it. 
The complex interrelationship between commitments and interests 
is the focus of this Essay, which maps some of the salient features of 
commitment-interest mechanics as a starting point for further 
research into the dynamics and possibilities of this interaction. Such 
an exercise promises both theoretical and practical benefits. As a 
theoretical matter, reconceptualizing negotiation as an ecology of 
interest-based commitments helps reorient the negotiator (or the 
mediator, facilitator, etc.) toward a better understanding of the 
ongoing significance of past decisions as well as the future 
implications of present agreements.
4
 As a practical matter, 
 
 2. Mergers and acquisitions (―M&A‖) negotiations, for example, are notorious for their 
high failure rate despite having incredibly sophisticated and skilled negotiators on both sides. 
See, e.g., DANNY ERTEL & MARK GORDON, THE POINT OF THE DEAL: HOW TO NEGOTIATION 
WHEN ―YES‖ IS NOT ENOUGH 184 (2007) (noting that, regarding business combinations, ―more 
than half of these deals destroy value‖). Although there is no consensus around why 
combinations fail, one common explanation is that negotiators often do not take corporate 
cultures and other implementation concerns into account when working through the deal. Put 
another way, negotiators do not perceive the potential impacts of previous institutional 
commitments around various aspects of workplace culture, including staffing, reporting 
structures, organizational priorities, and so on. Id.  
 3. See DONALD N. SULL, WHY GOOD COMPANIES GO BAD AND HOW GREAT 
MANAGERS REMAKE THEM (2003) [hereinafter WHY GOOD COMPANIES GO BAD]; see also 
Donald N. Sull, Managing by Commitments, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2003, at 82, 84 (―Caught 
up in the hurly-burly of the present, managers often take actions that, while beneficial in the 
near term, impose lasting constraints on their operations and organizations. When markets or 
competitive conditions change, they can find themselves unable to respond effectively–even 
though they may see a threat clearly and know they must take action. They find themselves 
caught in a web of commitments that they (or their predecessors) have spun.‖) [hereinafter 
Managing By Commitments].  
 4. See ERTEL & GORDON, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that parties often negotiate as 
though future implementation does not matter); see also Amy Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, 
Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009) (pointing out, in 
a different context, how the failure to understand future implications of scaling private interest-
based negotiated processes to large populations may perpetuate existing social inequalities). 
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incorporating a more nuanced treatment of interest-based 
commitments into a negotiator‘s structured preparation and process 
may improve agreement durability and participant satisfaction. 
Part II of this Essay frames the analysis around a dispute systems 
design case study. Dispute systems design (―DSD‖) is the ―applied 
discipline of institutional design‖ relating to the management of 
conflict and disputes.
5
 DSD draws upon a variety of specializations 
and skill sets, from organizational development to interpersonal 
dispute resolution practices, to develop systematic approaches to 
recurrent or anticipated disputes in institutions and groups.
6
 For the 
present analysis, such an example limits the scope and players, so 
that we can more easily trace past commitments that reach into future 
negotiations. Moreover, as legal negotiators continue working 
through the possible applications of large-scale ADR processes—
such as DSD, collaborative governance, and other methodologies 
designed for and delivered to large groups of people (companies, 
nations, etc.)—using examples that illustrate the system effects of 
interest-based methodologies may provide helpful frameworks for 
analysis.
7
  
Part III situates the case study within recent scholarship that 
critically analyzes the notion of ―interests‖ in interest-based 
negotiation. To the extent that commitments reflect the interests of 
the parties, the reliability and integrity of those interests will affect 
the nature and quality of commitments made. If interests are a 
disintegrating category, as some scholars assert, then what does that 
mean for interest-based commitments? Part IV considers the past-
future aspect of commitments-as-interests, drawing on research from 
Donald Sull, a business school professor specializing in management 
and strategy. Sull‘s work dissects the complex interplay of 
commitments in organizational and individual priorities and 
activities, examining how these commitments often work to the 
 
 5. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the Rule 
of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 75 (2011). 
 6. Id. See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, 
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING 
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988). 
 7. As opposed to, for example, starting from a simplified bilateral model (e.g., asking for 
a raise, renting a car) and then extrapolating to more complex scenarios. 
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detriment of each other.
8
 He argues that what makes this conflict of 
past and present commitments so potentially destructive is that it 
frequently goes unnoticed, whether by negotiators or by the parties 
themselves. Part V considers the implications of Sull‘s research for 
negotiation practice and theory, and suggests possible approaches for 
negotiators seeking to bring the parties' commitments-informed 
interests into sharper focus during the preparation stage of the 
negotiation. Part VI concludes with possible directions for future 
research.  
II. CASE STUDY 
Consider an example of DSD in an academic setting. This 
example features a university (―the University‖) undergoing the 
transformative changes brought about by the tremendous advances in 
microcomputing that occurred between the 1970s and 2000s. To 
understand the DSD dimensions of this situation, some backstory is 
needed. The short version of this backstory is that during that time 
the University, like so many other academic and business 
communities, moved from punch cards to the internet, and managing 
this transformation in the late 1990s required intense negotiations and 
careful dispute systems planning.
9
 
The longer version: More than thirty years ago, the University 
decided to automate its central business processes. This was early in 
the personal and business computing revolution, so little demand or 
 
 8. Substantial literature explores the overlap between management theory and 
negotiation, and this Essay seeks to contribute to that body of research. See, e.g., MAX H. 
BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (6th ed., 2006); DAVID A. LAX & 
JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND 
COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986). The emerging ADR subspecialty of ―dispute systems design‖ 
arguably captures and repackages an important management-level set of responsibilities. For 
example, many dispute systems feature an ―ombuds‖ or other influential organizational figure 
(a manager type) who takes ultimate responsibility for and control over resolving disputes and 
giving feedback to the organization. See, e.g., Carole S. Houk & Lauren M. Edelstein, Beyond 
Apology to Early Non-Judicial Resolution: The MedicOm Program as a Patient-Safety Focused 
Alternative to Malpractice Litigation, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 411 (2008) (advocating 
within dispute systems design context for the use of medical ombuds/mediator programs to 
resolve patient and provider disputes and medical malpractice claims in a non-adversarial way). 
 9. This example comes from my own experience as the facilitator of a campus-wide 
technology rollout (here, incorporating Java into the University toolkit) from 2001–2004 at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  
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money was available for this initiative. As a result, the University 
hired people with non-technical backgrounds (many from teaching 
and academia—this was a college town, and as such graduate 
students were a plentiful source of skilled and relatively cheap labor) 
and trained them to design administrative applications using easy-to-
learn mainframe technologies and architectures. This strategy 
supported the University‘s interests in managing costs while offering 
relatively cutting-edge, versatile systems. Using software written by 
smart non-programmers, the University created a powerful central 
computing structure for payroll, accounting, human resources, 
student information, and other administrative areas at relatively low 
cost. Moreover, because these technologies were home grown, they 
were customized to meet the exact needs of administrative users and 
could be tweaked and embellished to meet evolving user demands. 
As the technological landscape began to change in the 1990s, the 
University sought to take advantage of the tremendous upsides 
offered by the World Wide Web.
10
 Student grades, financial aid, 
admissions, employment—all these paper-based and labor-intensive 
functions could be made more efficient and user-friendly through 
web interfaces and portals. Relying on its in-house model, the 
University began training its existing and newly hired programming 
staff to write web pages, using a scripting language developed by one 
of the University‘s most talented programmers. The decision to use 
an in-house scripting language was not controversial; the 
programming community reasoned that an in-house person could 
develop something that was sufficiently similar to the mainframe 
language so that the learning curve for the existing analysts would 
not be as steep as it would be if one of the standard, widely used, and 
more technical ―outside‖ languages were adopted. Once trained, 
campus software developers spent much of their time creating web-
based versions of familiar mainframe applications and creating new 
 
 10. Many online repositories document the incredible developments of the 1990s, as the 
World Wide Web made possible the large-scale public and commercial use of the internet. For 
an overview of these topics see A Brief History of the Internet, available at http://www.walt 
howe.com/navnet/history.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012); A Little History of the World Wide 
Web, available at http://www.w3.org/History.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).  
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webpages for students, alumni, job applicants, and other non-
administrative users.  
By the late 1990s, however, the downsides to the University‘s 
train-non-experts and write-everything-to-order strategy began to 
emerge. High-functioning inexpensive software and technically 
skilled workers started entering the market, but the University could 
not take advantage of these developments because the organization 
had already sunk tremendous resources into a legacy system 
maintained by a developer community trained in a single toolset. 
Management recognized that this situation was increasingly 
expensive and unwieldy, but they could not reconcile this new 
recognition with what had worked in the past.
11
 The software 
developers themselves were even less effective at responding to 
market and consumer changes. Realizing that their mainframe 
programming abilities were quickly becoming obsolete, they 
countered change by leaning on relationships, appealing to traditional 
values, and pointing to previous successes. The University‘s interests 
in low-cost, high-quality systems remained the same, but its existing 
commitments—to non-technical labor, to in-house programming 
languages, to home-built customized systems—no longer served 
those interests. The commitments from the past, which had facilitated 
stunning progress, now hindered positive change and constricted 
future growth. 
What does all this have to do with legal negotiation? Before 
continuing, let‘s consider how interests and commitments animate the 
narrative so far. 
III. INTERESTS  COMMITMENTS 
The story of the University begins in a similar way to many 
interest-based negotiations and mediations. Participants come to the 
table to discuss their needs, concerns, goals, fears; they brainstorm 
possible options, make trades if they can, look to objective criteria to 
 
 11. Tech-savvy students had high expectations, and the University tried to respond using 
the same technologies as before. Emulating graphics-rich commercial products with a 
mainframe-based system is difficult, expensive, and often unsuccessful. Failure was often 
attributed to insufficient time, not to untrained staff or outdated toolsets. 
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help justify one strategy over another, and develop a plan for moving 
forward. Here, the negotiation primarily involved the arrangement of 
administrative and academic affairs such that the University would be 
able to realize its computing goals without incurring exorbitant 
costs.
12
 When the University set its first data processing goals in the 
1970s, these institutional interests in technological savviness, 
business efficiency, and fiscal responsibility led to a series of 
commitments around training inexpensive non-technical people to 
develop custom-built software.  
Indeed, the end game of an interest-based process is the 
commitment, the ultimate tangible or intangible manifestation of 
some number of these interests raised in the negotiation. Certainly the 
University‘s commitments to its software development strategy 
illustrate this transformation. Before considering the counter-
transformation—that is, commitments becoming interests—is 
instructive to revisit the underlying concepts and implications of 
interests in interest-based processes. 
The importance of interests is axiomatic in interest-based 
bargaining.
13
 Roger Fisher writes that ―the basic problem in a 
negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict 
between each side‘s needs, desires, concerns, and fears.‖14 Robert 
Mnookin adds that ―too often, people focus their preparation too 
narrowly‖ and overlook relevant motivations and concerns.15 
Negotiators identify interests so they can figure out how to leverage 
and resolve shared and conflicting interests. Some interests and 
concerns can be anticipated through a formal preparation process 
(such as the ―seven elements‖16) and an across-the-table integrative 
 
 12. Group decision-making often involves what Ertel and Gordon call ―internal 
negotiations,‖ which are conceptually distinct from dispute resolution and dealmaking 
scenarios. See ERTEL & GORDON, supra note 2, at 13–14 (describing the three primary arenas 
of negotiation as conflict resolution, dealmaking, and ―mak[ing] arrangements for working 
together‖).  
 13. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11 (recommending famously to ―[f]ocus on 
interests, not positions‖). 
 14. Id. at 42. 
 15. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 28 (2000). 
 16. The seven elements are alternatives, interests, options, legitimate criteria, 
communication, relationship, and commitment. See Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE 
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process audits these guessed-at interests and ideally pulls out 
additional interests and priorities. On this view, hidden interests—
anything intentionally kept secret or inadvertently overlooked—
might serve strategic distributional purposes, but can also potentially 
disrupt the process, undermine trust, leave money on the table, and 
threaten the integrity of the resultant deal.
17
  
Integrative theory posits that interest-based commitments are 
more durable (―win-win‖) because they answer the parties‘ actual 
needs and concerns, which foster buy-in and cooperation through 
implementation and beyond. That argument assumes, of course, that 
interests are reliable indicators of what parties truly want. 
Additionally, the entire interest-based canon privileges private 
interests—interests that may lead to commitments that in turn may 
have implications that extend beyond the parties themselves—to an 
extent that demands closer examination, especially as interest-based 
ADR processes are deployed to larger and larger populations. These 
two broad areas of critique provide a starting point for closer 
examination of commitments in an interest-based framework.  
A. We Don’t Know What We Want 
Many negotiation scholars today are well versed in cognitive 
biases, heuristics, schemas, and other psychological predilections that 
inform individual and group behavior. For these scholars, the 
―rational choice‖ model of negotiation, which presupposes that 
parties work to maximize their own welfare through the pursuit of 
static and identifiable interests, has become the strawman for a more 
nuanced conversation about how people actually behave (even if this 
strawman still generally dictates the contours of negotiation process 
 
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279–85 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 
2005).  
 17. See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations, 59-OCT 
DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 59 (2004) (noting that sharing interests fully ―offers benefits and poses risks 
because of the clash of two fundamental goals: the negotiator wants to maximize the creation of 
joint value and maximize personal gains from the negotiations‖); see also John Lande, Getting 
the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 137, 188 (2000) (recounting survey results that indicate most businesspeople and lawyers 
believe that ―it is normally appropriate to focus on underlying interests‖ of all parties concerned 
in negotiation and mediation).  
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and pedagogy).
18
 Principals and agents in negotiation contexts are not 
robots but emotive, affective, irrational human beings, often with 
shifting and inconsistent interests that depend greatly on time, 
circumstance, mood, and context. As Chris Guthrie and David Sally 
write, the assumption that people know what they want may be 
foundational to integrative bargaining but nonetheless should be 
reexamined:  
Proponents of problem-solving negotiation thus argue that 
disputants should strive not merely to assert positions but 
rather to identify and satisfy their underlying interests. Indeed, 
according to the proponents of this approach to negotiation, the 
object of a negotiation is to satisfy underlying interests. On this 
view, disputants should try to get what they really want at the 
bargaining table. 
But what if they do not know what they really want?
19
 
Following social psychology research, Guthrie and Sally note that 
people are simply not good at predicting the impact of future events, 
valuing losses and gains, and knowing what will make them happy.
20
 
Additionally, people often want things that, when they get them, they 
do not actually want or like; such ―miswanting‖ is problematic not 
only in legal negotiation but in any client-driven process (such as 
 
 18. See, e.g., Ran Kuttner, The Wave/Particle Tension in Negotiation, 16 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 331, 332 (2011) (arguing that the negotiation process is better understood as an 
―emergent system‖ that extends beyond static, discrete interests and individual personalities); 
Kenneth H. Fox, Negotiation as a Postmodern Process, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION 
TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 20–23 (Christopher Honeyman et al. 
eds., 2009) (contrasting the ―individualist and rational‖ model of negotiation with an ―emergent 
and dynamic‖ enterprise in which parties ―‗co-create‘ meaning‖). But see Amy J. Cohen, 
Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 
523 (2008) (arguing that most modern negotiation scholars still ―believe in the possibility, 
along with the value, of making individuals into [rationally acting] self-managers: purpose, self-
reflexive, and able to think clearly and act creatively in conditions of uncertainty‖).  
 19. Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 817, 817 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 20. Id. at 818–21. Much fascinating legal scholarship applies social psychology to legal 
processes and problems. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Law and the Stable Self, 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1173 (2010) (examining reliability of expressed individual preferences in light of 
social psychology); Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008) 
(considering policy implications for tort law when considering affective forecasting problems 
and focusing illusions on the part of victims, juries, and judges). 
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software development, for example).
21
 The upshot of these 
psychological misfires is that many of an individual‘s interests—
which understandably may be based on predictions about what will 
happen in the future, valuations of what could be lost or gained, 
hopes that some acquisitions or activities will bring happiness, fears 
that other developments will lead to failure and ruin—are shockingly 
unreliable. As Guthrie and Sally point out, the lack of awareness 
around these prevalent tendencies has an obvious impact on a process 
devoted to the recognition and satisfaction of interests.
22
  
Moreover, for an analyst focusing on the durability of interest-
based commitments, these developments are provocative because 
they suggest that even the most faithful, transparent, and expressive 
commitment might be unworkable because of mercurial, shifting, 
erroneous interests. Moreover, as scholars continue to evaluate the 
role of emotions in negotiation—not just as distortions to be filtered 
out, but also as inevitable and perhaps even valuable contributors to 
the overall decision-making process—the impact of such research on 
the resultant commitment remains to be seen.
23
 Perhaps emotions 
themselves can be an important heuristic in divining ―true‖ interests 
and therefore could play a key corrective role in miswanting and 
other problems. How, however, do these insights implicate 
commitments, which often transcend the parties (or at least their 
moods at the time of the negotiation) and persist into the future? As 
the role of emotions in decision-making contexts such as negotiation 
 
 21. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the 
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN 
SOCIAL COGNITION 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000). Clients who miswant or otherwise change 
their minds are familiar fixtures in software design. See, e.g., KENT BECK, EXTREME 
PROGRAMMING EXPLAINED: EMBRACE CHANGE (2d ed. 2004) (suggesting an iterative approach 
to design that accommodates the predictably shifting, changing, often inconsistent interests of 
clients and users).  
 22. See Guthrie & Sally, supra note 19, at 828 (noting that ―the most significant problem 
plaguing disputants may very well be that they cannot always know what they want‖). 
 23. See Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal 
Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 238 (2005) (―[I]t is only by 
recognizing . . . emotional content and better synthesizing emotional and analytical responses to 
negotiating stimuli that we can advance our skills to the next level‖); see also David J. Arkush, 
Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes 
for Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2008) (arguing against the 
prevailing assumption that ―emotion in the decisionmaking process‖ is ―bad‖). 
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continues to generate critical study, determining how affective and 
emotive factors contribute to the development and implementation of 
commitments is an important area of future research. 
B. Interests and Values Are Not the Same 
Beyond whether we can identify interests accurately, some 
scholars question the ideological valences of a negotiation model that 
accords so much privilege to private individual interests. These 
scholars look at the impacts on the negotiating parties and on the 
wider community. In both cases, issues of morality and values come 
into play as separate from interests themselves, which suggests a 
possible dissonance between what we want and what should happen 
as a matter of social justice, public and political morality, or 
individual values.  
To illustrate this inherent tension between interests and values in 
interest-based negotiation, Kevin Avruch provides an example of two 
parents, devout followers of different religions, who must negotiate 
about the religious background they will choose for their newborn 
child.
24
 In this kind of situation, value-creating trades (playing on 
differences in forecasting or risk preferences) and process norms 
(seniority, flipping a coin, I cut you choose) do not provide much 
guidance. Importantly, the ―value creation‖ in interest-based 
methodologies refers more to economic precepts of utility, not 
deontological principles of values or morality. As such, Avruch‘s 
―two-religions‖ problem resists conventional interest-based analysis, 
because it does not draw on or benefit from an essentially economic 
approach. 
Taken more broadly, as Amy Cohen and others have argued, 
interest-based negotiation valorizes individual private choice and 
preferences, and thus expresses and perpetuates neoliberal, capitalist 
ideologies here and abroad.
25
 Again, the realization of Pareto-optimal 
 
 24. Kevin Avruch, Toward an Expanded “Canon” of Negotiation Theory: Identity, 
Ideological, and Values-Based Conflict and the Need for a New Heuristic, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 
567, 578–82 (2006). 
 25. See Cohen, supra note 4; see also Amy Guttman, How Not To Resolve Moral 
Conflicts in Politics, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6–7 (1999) (pointing out that an 
interest-based dispute resolution procedure does not necessarily lead to moral or fair results); 
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solutions between two parties does not necessarily (though arguably 
it could) improve social welfare or accord with principles of public 
justice or political morality. One recent manifestation of these 
concerns comes up in the current debate around the appropriateness 
of mediator neutrality with respect to human rights:
26
 In the pursuit of 
neutral facilitation, should mediators permit agreements that would 
impinge upon the human rights of one or both of parties? If not, what 
kinds of guidelines should mediators use to preserve the benefits of 
neutrality and impartiality while according the appropriate measure 
of dignity and social morality into the process? The implications of 
these important and difficult questions are outside the scope of this 
Essay, other than to point out that the hegemony of interests in 
interest-based processes is eroding from several critical angles. 
For our University case study, thinking about these recent critical 
reexaminations of interests helps explain, at least in part, the failure 
of the original decision-makers to anticipate the possibility that 
integration with external systems and bringing on technological 
specialists might someday be desirable, especially if the cost picture 
changed. The commitment to home-grown technologies became a 
blind spot for University administrators, who continued charting the 
same course even as external conditions changed. Certainly, blind 
spots are not uncommon when organizations and individuals make 
decisions; otherwise, possible choices might be endlessly debated 
with no change ever occurring. Moreover, in this case the University 
might argue that it could not have anticipated the move toward 
interoperability that the technological industry ending up taking.
27
 In 
any event, the proposition that one‘s articulated interests may not 
actually capture what one truly wants—whether because of 
 
Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions about Conflict 
Management—In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 573 (2002). 
 26. Jim Cavallaro and Stephan Sonnenberg raised this issue at the 2011 Roundtable and 
are currently wrestling with these sorts of institutional and philosophical disconnects in the 
development of their International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution clinic at Stanford 
Law School. See Stephan Sonnenberg & James L. Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build 
Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 
257 (2012). 
 27. In hindsight, that argument may not be convincing; at the time, however, it was 
difficult to imagine how interconnected and technologically sophisticated the world would 
become.  
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forecasting problems, clouded judgment, or lack of information—
gives rise to interesting and important questions around the 
development of agreements that can provide for this uncertainty 
without undermining the stated interests of negotiating parties (who, 
quite reasonably, believe that they know what they want) and without 
destabilizing any agreements that the parties want to implement. 
IV. COMMITMENTS  INTERESTS 
Using social psychology to complicate and enhance our 
understanding of interest-based processes, as in the critiques noted 
above, has greatly benefitted negotiation and ADR scholarship. 
Additionally, for those ADR analysts interested in organizational 
and/or system-based dispute resolution and decision-making 
processes (such as those envisioned by dispute systems designers or 
collaborative governance process architects or ombuds offices), 
business scholarship may provide additional insights.  
The work of management expert Donald Sull, for example, is 
particularly relevant. Sull studies ―good companies that go bad,‖ 
organizations that have been successful and subsequently become 
―trapped by success.‖28 Sull defines this phenomenon as ―active 
inertia, or management‘s tendency to respond to . . . disruptive 
changes by accelerating activities that succeeded in the past.‖29 
Through detailed case studies of these previous-successful but 
presently-struggling companies, Sull explores how the smart, 
interest-based decisions of the past often impose structural, 
organizational, and psychological constraints on the future by 
becoming embedded interests—albeit often hidden ones—that 
(negatively?) direct and shape present decisions.
30
  
Sull‘s definition of ―commitment‖ is congruent with the general 
definition used in negotiation theory and practice: ―any action taken 
in the present that binds an organization [or an individual]
31
 to a 
 
 28. WHY GOOD COMPANIES GO BAD, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
 29. Id. at 24. 
 30. This overview is simplified to demonstrate practical applications of the doctrine for 
negotiators. Professor Sull‘s works cited in this paper deserve closer examination by negotiators 
interested in organizational change and systems design. See supra note 3.  
 31. Sull asserts that the commitments-based model is not limited to the corporate world, 
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future course of action.‖32 Examples of commitments include 
investment, disinvestment, public promises and assertions, 
relationships, personnel decisions, and information systems.
33
 The 
entrepreneur who purchases a parcel of land, the executive who hires 
an assistant, the parent who promises to coach the soccer team, are all 
examples of binding decisions that foreclose other choices. Although 
such commitments are not necessarily permanent, they have an 
internal momentum that can be difficult to reverse, especially as 
external dependencies arise. If the entrepreneur cannot obtain 
favorable zoning, for example, she might need to sell the parcel right 
away, and she also might need to file an appeal, remove building 
materials, change advertisements and listings, alleviate investor 
concerns, reexamine her financing, and identify another suitable 
location. Undoing the commitment is much more complicated than 
making it.
34
 
Sull sorts these and other commitments into five categories: 
strategic frames, resources, processes, relationships, and values.
35
 
Viewing commitments within these categories highlights their 
dualistic, sometimes contradictory natures: a company‘s commitment 
to fair labor practices, for example, may be threatened by other 
commitments to cost-cutting and solvency. Additionally, even if 
commitments are not presently conflicting, they may eventually 
conflict with one another as time goes by. Put another way, 
organizations make commitments in support of some present 
organizational goal/interests, and as those commitments age, they 
may become obsolete or even subvert the original motivation 
goal/interests. The manager—and likewise the negotiator helping 
shepherd parties through dispute resolution or decision-making—
must be able to identify and work with these inherent tensions. Sull‘s 
 
but also holds true for individuals. See Managing by Commitments, supra note 3, at 82. People 
define goals, acquire things, rely upon processes, cultivate relationships, and honor values. 
They often find themselves dealing in the present with the negative effects of past choices—
choices that once served important purposes and made sense. Id. 
 32. Id. at 84. 
 33. Id. at 85. 
 34. See Donald N. Sull, Do Your Commitments Match Your Convictions?, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan. 2005, at 84 (noting that ―the most binding commitments in business are often so 
mundane as to be almost invisible‖). 
 35. Id. at 86; see also WHY GOOD COMPANIES GO BAD, supra note 3, at 45–49. 
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five categories, along with the classic dissonance experienced within 
each, are as follows:
36
 
 Strategic frames comprise the collective goals and shared 
vision that inform a company‘s approach to its industry. 
Without strategy, a company runs the risk of diluting its 
focus and energies by moving in too many directions at 
once. However, unexamined strategic frames can blind 
companies to evolving conditions and new markets.
37
 
 Resources refer to a company‘s assets, including 
intellectual capital. Sull notes that companies make 
resource decisions to support development and delivery of 
products and services. Once acquired, however, resources 
can become burdensome and make it difficult to respond to 
new challenges.
38
  
 Companies establish and use formal processes to manage 
workflow. Such processes are usually more efficient than 
ad hoc approaches, but also can reduce overall adaptability 
and turn functional units into silos.
39
  
 Forging strong relationships between individuals inside 
and outside the company (clients, employees, providers) 
helps establish market presence and reputation; but these 
same relationships can become shackles when the need for 
change arises.
40
  
 Finally, values are the collective understanding and ethos 
of the organization, the ―shared norms that unite and 
inspire employees.‖41 Values can be a powerful motivating 
 
 36. Professor Sull argues that when a company begins to suffer from active inertia, 
strategic frames can become blinders, resources can become millstones, processes can become 
routines, relationships can become shackles, and values can become dogmas. See WHY GOOD 
COMPANIES GO BAD, supra note 3, at 29–42. 
37.  Id. at 10-11. 
38.  Id. at 11-12. 
39.  Id. at 12-13. 
40.  Id. at 13-14. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
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force in a company, but also can lead to group-think or 
other unproductive orthodoxy.
42
 
Sull‘s classification of commitments into strategic frames, resources, 
processes, relationships, and values provides a helpful nuance to 
understanding commitments in action. For the interest-based 
negotiator, this classification makes it easier to see how past 
commitments become present or future interests. The organization 
that commits itself now to a cultural norm of cooperation, for 
example, may have an unstated but robust belief in ―maintaining a 
cooperative workplace‖ that may reemerge as an interest in future 
negotiations and decision-making.  
Returning to the University case study, it is apparent that many 
different kinds of commitments were in play. First, the University 
recognized the need to automate and improve administrative 
processes (strategic frames) and hired people into analyst positions 
(resources). Because these analysts were non-technical, the 
University could hire them cheaply, but needed to train them 
(resources). To reduce training time and ensure that the non-technical 
analysts could handle the work, the University limited the scope and 
complexity of the toolset (resources, processes). Because all systems 
were home-grown and campus analysts went through the same hiring 
and training process, significant economies of scale and integration 
advantages emerged, keeping costs down (resources, processes, 
relationships). A culture of cooperation and teamwork developed, 
along with a strong independent streak and organizational pride 
(relationships, values). These commitments gave the University 
momentum throughout the mainframe computer era and the advent of 
the Internet, and supported institutional interests in low cost, system-
wide integration, and high portability.  
For negotiators, Sull‘s classification of commitments is the first 
useful part of his theory because it provides a more concrete way of 
 
 42. See Robert Kegan & Lisa L. Lahey, The Real Reason People Won’t Change, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov. 2001, at 51, 53 (identifying unconscious commitments to particular identity 
pieces as a primary source of change resistance, even if consciously the person supports the 
change); see also DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS 
WHAT MATTERS MOST 113–21 (1999) (describing the ―identity quake‖ that occurs when a 
conversation implicates core identity pieces). 
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understanding how past commitments can become present interests 
for individuals and organizations. Having a rubric for analysis makes 
it easier to parse the otherwise undifferentiated flow of information 
that negotiators must manage. A second important insight from Sull‘s 
theory is that the transformation from commitment to interest often 
happens invisibly. In other words, past commitments do not just 
become present interests; they can easily become present hidden 
interests. As aggregates of interests arising from pressures existing in 
the past, commitments persevere in the guise of strategic frames, 
processes, resource allocation, relationships, and values. Because 
they are such an intrinsic part of the cultural and organizational 
narrative, their influence or importance may go undetected when new 
negotiations or decision-making processes are underway. Sull points 
out that this can lead to difficulties in implementing new agreements 
and pursuing new opportunities, especially for companies that have 
successfully followed past commitments—even if the company wants 
to implement and pursue new agreements and opportunities.
43
  
With Sull‘s commitment categories in mind, let us return to the 
example. In the early 2000s, the University considered how to take 
advantage of the skyrocketing developments in IT generally, 
considering its long-standing commitments to in-house technologies. 
To determine possible areas and needs that would benefit from 
outside technologies, project planners from the central IT unit 
developed an assessment plan and began interviewing department 
heads from around campus. What started as a project planning 
campaign quickly turned into an opportunity for dispute systems 
design, as planners immediately and repeatedly encountered 
surprisingly vehement resistance from the departments. Departments 
claimed that the new technology had an exorbitant learning curve, 
that new servers would overcrowd the machine rooms, and that there 
were too many high-priority projects already. Moreover, developers 
argued that training some people but not others in new technologies 
would create an undesirable caste system among University 
 
 43. See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 42 (arguing that change resistance may come from 
unconscious competing commitments that coexist with conscious support and desire for the 
proposed change). 
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programmers and compromise the collegial atmosphere that had 
fostered so many high-quality, responsive data processing systems. 
Those objecting to the proposed new technologies were not, in 
fact, framing their arguments as interests. Rather, they saw their 
concerns as common-sense, unavoidable observations about the way 
―the culture‖ and ―the industry‖ operated.44 University facilitators, 
however, believed that these disconnected objections were actually 
interests that derived from the organization‘s original defining 
commitments to mainframe programming and non-technical staff. In 
meetings with department heads, the facilitators asked two kinds of 
questions: those that followed up on explicit concerns, and those that 
implicated more indirect or seemingly unrelated concerns based on 
the five commitment categories. In this way, they were able to 
approximate broad contours of commitments at stake and start talking 
with senior University management about possible persuasive 
approaches and realistic transforming strategies. Putting together a 
―training camp‖ for senior programmers to study new technologies 
for one month during the summer, conducting town halls to talk 
through the plan and reassure the programming staff of its 
contributions to the campus, and developing hybrid projects between 
new IT staff and existing programmers—many of whom had become 
business process experts in their areas possessing important skills and 
knowledge—were some of the early strategies deployed by the team 
to accommodate both the embedded interests created by previous 
commitments as well as the new interests in incorporating forward-
looking technologies and practices into the organization.
45
 
 
 44. Perhaps another frame on the analysis is that previous commitments had become 
conflated with present legitimate criteria. 
 45. Professor Sull advocates a three-step process for transforming commitments: selecting 
an anchor, securing the anchor, and the aligning the organization. This enables companies to 
manage transformation by starting with a modest commitment and then recalibrating other 
frames, processes, resources, and so on. See Managing by Commitments, supra note 3, at 90–
91. Such an approach is consistent with conflict theorists who recommend piecemeal or partial 
commitments as a possible strategy for groups locked in intractable conflicts. See BERNARD 
MAYER, STAYING WITH CONFLICT: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ONGOING DISPUTES 181–206 
(2009). Mayer argues that agreements can play a productive role in intractable ongoing 
conflicts through ―bridge building, boundary creation, process formation, and conflict framing.‖ 
Id. at 189. 
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Negotiators, mediators, ombudspersons, and process designers 
have much in common with project planners and change agents in 
that they attempt to shepherd parties away from the status quo. A 
negotiation that appears to be about the future—what the parties will 
do after reaching an agreement—may actually be substantially about 
the past, as negotiators unearth hidden or embedded interests that are 
actually commitments based on previous interests and priorities and 
that persist even if they are no longer instrumental or even valid in 
the present. This can create an additional layer of complexity for 
negotiators who must not only determine what future commitments 
are desired and how they can be reached, but also which past 
commitments need unwinding, or at least some sort of 
accommodation.  
V. IMPLICATIONS 
But do these observations about commitments and interests in an 
organizational DSD context apply with equal force to ―typical‖ legal 
negotiations and mediations? An early objection might be that only 
internal negotiators such as in-house counsel or ombuds offices can 
undertake and benefit from an in-depth analysis of the 
interrelationship of commitments and interests over time. Indeed, 
Sull‘s theory of commitments was an especially effective framework 
for the University planners precisely because they were inside agents 
who could work through the politics and history that characterize 
large interconnected workplaces. For the legal negotiator or mediator, 
having this degree of access to the parties‘ background and 
institutional culture may not be possible. There may not be enough 
time to ask the right questions, and even if there was, parties might be 
nervous about providing (or unable to consciously explain) the entire 
backstory of how things came to be as they are now. Additionally, 
even if parties were entirely forthcoming with the details, the legal 
negotiator or mediator might run the risk of information overload or, 
as a relatively peripheral agent, simply be unable to process the 
information within the proper context. 
This objection has two parts, one substantive and one procedural. 
The procedural objection is that even assuming that Sull‘s theory 
does apply to all negotiations and mediations with equal force, the 
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structural constraints of most negotiation and mediation settings 
make the theory difficult or impossible to put into practice. The 
substantive objection argues that these commitments-oriented 
observations are most relevant in DSD and other organizational 
contexts, in which negotiations and decisions interconnect over the 
years through shared personnel, values, resources, processes, and so 
on. As such, the substantive objection limits Sull‘s insights to the 
management arena, noting the wide gulf between a large-scale 
corporate strategy session and the small claims mediation featuring a 
contractor disputing with a homeowner over an unpaid garage door 
installation.  
Taking the substantive objection first, although it is true that 
organizational negotiations may lend themselves naturally to 
commitments-based analysis, it is also true that any negotiation or 
mediation benefits from an understanding of embedded interests, 
including those that come from earlier interest-based commitments. 
Organizational psychologists Robert Kegan and Lisa Lahey point out 
that a negotiated agreement is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for change; in fact, they argue that individuals may happily agree to a 
plan that they are later unable to follow because they have—usually 
unknown to them–a competing commitment from the past: 
Resistance to change does not [necessarily] reflect opposition, 
nor is it [necessarily] merely a result of inertia. Instead, even as 
they hold a sincere commitment to change, many people are 
unwittingly applying productive energy toward a hidden 
competing commitment. The resulting dynamic equilibrium 
stalls the effort in what looks like resistance but is in fact a 
kind of personal immunity to change.
46
 
Kegan and Lahey provide various examples of individuals agreeing 
to a new change—accepting a promotion, for example—and then 
sabotaging or otherwise resisting the implementation of that change.
47
 
 
 46. See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 42, at 51 (emphasis omitted). 
 47. Kegan and Lahey give an example of a ―rising star‖ who received a high-profile 
project from her boss. Although the employee wants to succeed, she finds herself avoiding the 
project and inexplicably ―spinning her wheels.‖ Id. at 86. In analyzing this situation, she 
realized that she was invested in a certain kind of relationship with her boss–a subordinate/boss 
or mentee/mentor relationship–and this particular project might transform that relationship into 
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The takeaway of this research for negotiators and mediators, of 
course, is that reaching an agreement is not the same as making that 
deal happen in practice.
48
 Understanding that the negotiated or 
mediated conversation may need to include more exploration around 
possible roadblocks to implementation that relate specifically to past 
commitments, even if the conversation has already reached an 
agreement that appears to satisfy everyone, may help improve deal 
durability. Without this understanding, the potential for deal 
disruption and non-implementation increases, regardless of the size 
or scope of the negotiation. 
Turning now to the procedural objection, although it is true that 
most negotiators will be unable to comprehend fully the complexities 
of the parties and the circumstances, it is also true that an armchair 
understanding of commitments doctrine will nonetheless make 
negotiators more prepared, if only because an enhanced awareness of 
organizational dynamics can make it easier to ascertain high-priority 
interests and potential potholes.
49
 Such an understanding will help 
negotiators parse through proposals—identifying new commitments, 
reinforcing commitments, and transforming commitments
50—that 
will give negotiators a better sense of what closure might look like.
51
 
 
a peer relationship, which seemed fraught with unknowns and risks. Id. at 87. Kegan and Lahey 
point out that negotiating with such an employee is likely to be ineffective–since on the surface, 
both employee and boss share a common interest in the organization‘s success–unless the 
negotiation reveals that the employee is ―struggling unconsciously with an opposing agenda.‖ 
Id. Because the employee‘s struggle is unconscious, the manager-negotiator must enter the 
conversation anticipating the possibility that competing commitments might be an issue. 
 48. See ERTEL & GORDON, supra note 2. 
 49. Negotiators know that their success relies in large part upon thorough preparation. 
See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Negotiating Styles: The Impact on Bargaining Transactions, 58-
APR DISP. RESOL. J. 48, 53 (2003) (noting that ―[s]uccessful negotiators are thoroughly 
prepared, behave in an honest and ethical manner, are perceptive readers of others, and are 
analytical, realistic and convincing‖). 
 50. New commitments (or in Sull‘s words, ―defining commitments‖) come from present 
interests and do not compete with commitments made in the past. Reinforcing commitments 
restate and recommit the organization to one or more interests that they have already committed 
to. For example, a law firm with a long-standing commitment to pro bono work might require 
its attorneys to work at Legal Aid for a certain number of hours, thus reinforcing the 
organizational commitment to this kind of service. Transforming commitments specifically 
recognize the existence of an obsolete or harmful entrenched commitment and attempt to 
anchor the organization around an agreement that will help dislodge the old commitment and 
allow management to recalibrate. See supra note 45. 
 51. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 175 (advising readers to ―[t]hink about closure 
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After identifying a long held values-based commitment, for example, 
negotiators can talk with clients about an implementation plan that 
includes opportunities such as ―learning conversations‖ or other 
inclusive processes that validate cultural norms while providing a 
foundation for change. In short, being familiar with the temporal 
dimension of commitments, past and present, can help negotiators 
refine their approach and craft the best, most implementable deal 
possible. 
One example of commitments-sensitivity in practice may occur in 
client counseling and interviews. Commitment-oriented negotiators 
can ask questions that help determine what confluence of factors 
brought these particular parties to the table at this particular time. In 
other words, through such questions negotiators may discern what 
commitments are relevant to the discussion, what interests originally 
informed these commitments, and whether previous commitments 
and interests conflict with the goals of the specific negotiation. Fisher 
recommends asking ―Why?‖ and ―Why not?‖ when searching for 
interests that shape parties‘ positions.52 These simple questions may 
uncover commitments as well. Additionally, prefacing questions with 
general rationales (―the more I understand, the better advocate I can 
be‖) or more detailed accounts (―I am trying to get a picture of what 
led you to this point, so that we can be sure we‘re thinking through 
all the relevant interests and concerns‖) can situate inquiries into a 
commitments frame.
 53
 As the negotiator becomes more experienced 
at hearing these stories (especially if she works with the same 
organization in the future), she will have a better idea of how 
commitments work in the organization and can bring this awareness 
to the table.  
The table below lays out typical questions that interest-based 
negotiators and mediators ask clients and parties. The questions 
themselves are not new, but sorting them into Sull‘s five commitment 
categories (strategic frames, resources, processes, relationships, 
 
from the beginning‖ to help move the negotiation from inventing options to making 
commitments). 
 52. See id. at 45–46. 
 53. See, e.g., E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS 53–55 (1996). 
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values) provides negotiators with an integrated framework for 
thinking about the answers they receive when asking these familiar 
questions and may help flag potential embedded interests or 
competing commitments that could short-circuit value creation or 
disrupt the implementation of agreements.  
COMMITMENT TYPE TO ASK TO LISTEN FOR 
STRATEGIC FRAMES In your opinion, what 
brought us to this point? 
Why do you think this 
deal should happen 
now? 
How do your present 
choices work within the 
ecology of past, already-
made decisions? Do they 
clash? Are they synergistic? 
Will they coexist? 
RESOURCES Who is responsible for 
the deal going forward? 
Will the responsible 
person/team need 
additional support that 
we might consider now? 
How feasible are any 
proposed agreements 
considering current 
resource allocations? Do we 
need to rethink previous 
commitments in light of 
present concerns? 
PROCESSES What happens after 
we‘ve made the deal? 
Is there anyone missing 
from the table, who 
might have a stake in 
what we‘re doing? 
Should we expand our 
interest-based process to 
include the development of 
new routines or the 
dismantling of old ones? 
RELATIONSHIPS If we get what we‘re 
asking for, do you 
anticipate any pushback 
from management, 
colleagues, peers, or 
clients? If so, why? 
How might the present 
situation affect the client’s 
social/business networks not 
represented here? 
VALUES Tell me more about the 
guiding principles and 
values of you and your 
organization. 
How do you see this 
project fitting into your 
priorities? 
What previous decisions and 
priorities might manifest as 
cultural norms, legitimate 
criteria, “common sense,” 
or other cognitive limits? 
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Again, these questions are not unfamiliar to legal negotiators; they 
are the very questions many negotiators usually ask when seeking to 
discover interests. The difference here is that examining those 
answers through a commitments-oriented lens helps determine 
whether those answers suggest existing commitments that may 
support or undermine the new agreement. Moreover, understanding 
the questions as potentially related to commitments helps the 
negotiator comprehend the complexities of the organizational or 
interpersonal context and ask appropriate follow-up questions. If, for 
example, the client worries about possible pushback from the 
negotiation, a commitments-aware negotiator might respond by 
asking further about current communication processes and personnel, 
to get a more complete sense of how entrenched the existing 
commitment might be. These kinds of questions encourage both the 
negotiator and client to take a more contextualized view of the 
negotiation and perhaps catch a glimpse of commitments lurking 
underneath.  
In the final analysis, the reason all this matters to ADR theorists 
and practitioners comes down to a single idea: sensible, durable 
agreements. Private ordering, whether through mediation or 
negotiation or dispute systems design or any other ADR process, 
ultimately relies on the durability and stability of negotiated 
agreements. Much of interest-based negotiation, with its 
comprehensive treatment of substantive, procedural, and relational 
concerns, is aimed at the articulation and development of agreements 
that will last. At the same time, failing to recognize the ripple effects 
of enduring commitments can destabilize future agreements. The 
present discussion about interest-based commitments and 
commitment-based interests ultimately seeks to enrich interest-based 
theories and toolkits in order to facilitate sensible, durable, and stable 
outcomes over time.  
VI. NEXT STEPS 
This Essay establishes the starting parameters for a broad research 
agenda exploring the interrelationship between interests and 
commitments in ADR settings. First, this agenda envisions the 
continued collection and organization of research from 
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interdisciplinary sources to provide a useful foundation for legal 
empirical and theoretical work. Much has been accomplished already 
in this area, particularly by those scholars who have one foot in the 
law and the other in psychology, such as Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff 
and Jennifer Robbennolt.
54
 Additional insights from disciplines such 
as sociology, political science, and business may helpfully 
differentiate and enrich the ADR literature around commitments. 
Second, the agenda contemplates the development of empirical 
studies that clarify the relationship between participant satisfaction 
and implementation in legal negotiation settings. Whether satisfied 
participants in the present do or do not implement their agreements in 
the future is useful information for those in ADR practice. 
Additionally, studies that examine the temporal awareness of 
negotiation participants—for example, when parties imagine that they 
will want to do something in the future, do they consider what they 
have done/wanted in the past?—would be illuminating. Perhaps such 
studies could build on social psychology regarding temporal 
construal, which refers to the interrelation between how far away a 
planned event is and what kinds of features of that event are most 
salient.
55
  
Third and relatedly, the agenda envisions more toolset 
development that incorporates theoretical and empirical observations 
into practice. Again, scholars are already doing this kind of work, as 
process designers and conflict theorists continue to develop 
sophisticated approaches to identifying and managing potential 
roadblocks and dealkillers in organizational, international, and other 
group decision-making contexts.
56
 Building ―commitments with 
 
 54. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 
386 (2010) (considering social psychological developments around procedural justice within 
the ―Wild West‖ of negotiated agreements); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and 
Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008) (describing and explaining 
empirical psychological studies of apologies in settlement scenarios, along with attendant 
policy implications).  
 55. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 20, at 1177–81 (describing the phenomenon and 
supplying examples). 
 56. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 45, at 181–206; see also LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & 
JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT‘S RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR 
MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006) (providing a framework for 
developing consensus-based decisions); Cathy A. Costantino, Second Generation 
Organizational Conflict Management Systems Design: A Practitioner’s Perspective on 
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room,‖ for example, might create additional clarity around the 
inevitable changes that the future will bring so that parties can remain 
flexible but still prioritize particular courses of action. Further 
research on the strategic uses (and divestitures) of commitments 
would help refine and diversify this toolset, as a matter of practice 
and pedagogy.  
Negotiated agreements, especially those between repeat players, 
do not exist in a vacuum but instead become part of an ecology of 
commitments that influence present and future agreements. Indeed, it 
is the dynamic interplay between interests and commitments that 
makes negotiation possible. Parties bringing separate interests come 
together to determine whether they can, jointly, come up with 
commitments that address those interests. Without interests, there is 
no need for commitments. Without commitments, there is no way to 
operationalize interests that depend upon the contribution and 
participation of the other. Negotiators who can manage the temporal 
dimension of negotiation effectively—by unearthing existing 
commitments that may bear on present choices and then figuring out 
how to manage the tension between past commitments and present 
desires—stand a better chance to develop innovative and durable 
agreements. 
 
Emerging Issues, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2009) (considering the evolution of DSD 
practice and laying out challenges and questions around process, practitioners, and profession).  
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